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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEANNA POXLEY, J 
Plaintiff and \ 
Appellee, j 
vs. \ 
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY, \ 
Defendant and \ 
Appellant. j 
\ Case No. 890493A 
\ Response to Appellant's 
: Motion for Rehearing 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and Appellee, Deanna Foxley, 
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
at the request of this Court, and responds to the Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the Defendant and Appellant, Dr. William N. 
Foxley. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. 
THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THIS COURT "OVER-LOOKED" 
HIS ARGUMENT REGARDING THE INCREASE OF CHILD SUPPORT 
IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Appellant alleged in his peitition that this Court 
"over-looked his argument on the increase in child support." 
(Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, "APR", page 2.) In support 
of his position the Appellant submitted the following arguments. 
First, the Appellant alleged "Not only must the court 
find a substantial change of circumstances to justify an increase 
in child support, but the District Court must also have something 
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in the record to determine an amount." (APR, page 2.) and, 
second, the Appellant argued that Appellee "submitted no evidence 
at trial in support of an increase of child support." 
It should be noted that these same arguments were made 
by the Appellant in his brief on appeal (see Appellant's initial 
brief, pages 33-34 and his response to Appellee's brief, pages 
11-16), and that the Appellant has not cited any authority in 
support of his arguments. 
Notwithstanding the above, contrary to the allegations 
of the Appellant, the Court did find that there had been a 
substantial change of circumstances (see Amended Finding of 
Facts, Nos. 20 and 21). Furthermore, the record of this case 
supports the Trial Court's finding of a change of circumstances 
and the award of an increase of alimony. Appellant apparently 
chooses to ignore and/or disregard the findings of the the Trial 
Court and the evidence and testimony at trial. 
With regard to the substantial change of cirsumstances, 
it is clear that the Trial Court was meticulous and deliberate in 
its review of the evidence and its findings on this issue. It 
was undisputed that at the time of the divorce the Appellant's 
income was $50.00 per month (see Amended Findings of Fact, No. 3, 
which finding was based upon the financial declaration filed by 
the Appellant at the time of the divorce). At the time of the 
modification hearing the Trial Court found that the Appellant had 
an income in excess of $6,985.00 per month and that the Appellee 
had an income of $800.00 per month (see Amended Finding of Fact 
No. 22). 
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The evidence which supported the Trial Court's findings 
concerning the Appellant's income included, but was not limited 
to the Appellant's 1984-1987 Federal Tax Return, admitted as 
Trial Exhibits Nos. 4-7 and the Appellants own testimony which 
revealed that the Appellant earned in the first 6 months of private 
practice of medicine over $90,000.00, (TR2 106:3-12) The 
Appellant also testified that he was able to to invest $41,660.00 
into a Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987. (TR2 106:9-15) 
There was more than sufficient evidence for the Trial 
Court to conclude that there had been a sufficient change of 
circumstances to justify an increase in the amount of child 
support to be paid by the Appellant. 
This Court, in its written opinion, agreed with the 
Trial Court and held, "Clearly, the change in Mr. Foxley's income 
from the negligible earnings of an unemployed student to his 
earnings in recent years in excess of $100,000.00 per year is a 
substantial change of circumstances justifying a modification of 
the 1983 decree." This Court concluded, "In light of these 
findings (of the Trial Court), the increases in alimony and child 
support are far from abuses of the trail court's discretion." 
The next the Appellant maintains that the "District 
Court must also have something in the record to determine an 
amount". 
Clearly, the testimony and evidence presented to the 
Trial Court was sufficient for the Court to determine the 
respective incomes of the parties and then to also determine an 
-3-
award of child support pursuant to the child support guildlines 
then in effect. With regard to the Trial Courtfs findings on 
this issue see Amended Findings of Fact Nos. 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24. 
The Appellant, however, speculates "the court in 
Finding No. 21, based its award of child support solely on the 
Child Support Worksheet submitted after appellee's case was 
closed and with no basis or foundation. (APR, page 2.) 
Amended Finding of Fact No. 21, states: "Based upon 
the change of circumstances and the needs of the children, child 
support to be paid by the Defendant should be increased to the 
appropriate amount reflected in the judicial district's support 
guidelines." 
The Trial Court did not refer to or reference in this 
or any other Finding a child support worksheet prepared or 
submitted by the Appellee. The Appellant's arguement that the 
Trial Court's award of an increase of child support was based 
solely on a worksheet submitted after Appellee rested her case is 
based on unfounded speculation, is without merit in the record 
and should be disregarded by this Court. 
Again, for argument only, it is important to note, as 
referenced above, that the Trial Court found that the Appellee 
had a gross monthly income of $800.00 per month and that the 
Appellant had a gross monthly income in excess of $6,985.00 per 
month (Amended Finding of Facts, No. 22), that the proprortionate 
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share of the parties combined income was 10% and 90% for the 
Appellee and Appellant, respectively (Amended Finding of Facts, 
No. 23) and that based upon the parties combined adjusted gross 
income, the Appellant should pay as child support $546.00 per 
month per child (Amended Finding of Facts, No. 24.) 
The Trial Court made a Finding that an increase of 
child support was warranted based upon the evidence and testimony 
concerning the material change of circumstances which had occured 
since the decree was entered. The Trial Court then determined 
the amount of increase of child support pursuant to the child 
support guildlines. The Trial Court clearly complied with the 
provisions of the laws of this State regarding the determination 
of child support and, as such, the Appellants argument for 
rehearing of this issue is without merit. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE NECESSARY FACTORS 
IN AWARDING AN INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY. 
The issues and elements involved in awarding alimony 
were addressed by both parties in this appeal. (See Appellant's 
Brief, pages 9-29, and Appellantfs Reply Brief, pages 8-11.) 
Appellee submits that the Appellant is attempting to take another 
"shot" at an issue which has already been properly decided by 
both this Court and the Trial Court. 
The Appellant proposes the questions, "Can a requesting 
spouse come into court and say that she has this need or that 
need and not place into evidence a dollar amount that is 
necessary to satisfy the needs requested or to raise her standard 
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of living to a cerain level? Does a requesting party have to 
support the need with an express or implied dollar amount 
attached to that need or standard of living?" (APR, page 3.) 
The Appellant, however, failes to offer any authority 
to substantiate his allegation that a party must support a 
petition for alimony with mathmatical certainty or with an 
"express" dollar amount. 
It cannot be disputed that it is the purpose of the 
Trial Court to determine the amount of alimony based upon the 
criteria as set forth by the Supreme Court and based upon the 
evidence and testimony presented at trial. Gill v. Gill, 718, 
P2d 779 (Utah 1986), Savage v. Savage, 658 P2d 85 (Utah 1983), 
Bushell v. Bushell, 649, P2d 85 (Utah 1982), Smith v. Smith, 751 
P2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, the Appellee petitioned the Trial Court 
for an increase in alimony. The Trial Court, after the 
presentation of the evidence and testimony, held that the 
Appellee had "a real and substantial need for an increase in 
alimony" and that it was "just and equitable that the monthly 
alimony to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff should be 
increased" (See Amended Findings of Fact, Nos. 27 and 28.) 
The Appellant argues, however, that, "the Appellate 
Court over-looked the material factors enumerated by the Supreme 
Court which seems to require evidence of a dollar amount in 
setting an amount for alimony." Again the Appellant makes his 
argument on this issue without any reference to authority. 
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The Appellant refers this Court to the elements 
enumerated in the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P2d 1072 (Utah 
1985). Each of the elements referenced in Jones were addressed 
by the Trial Court in this case. The elements listed in Jones 
concerning alimony and the evidence and findings of the Trial 
Court are addressed below. 
i. Needs of the Appellee. Evidence of the financial 
condition and needs of the Appellee were presented at the 
trial. The Appellee testified that she had received a notice 
from the County Assessor's Office that her house was to be sold 
for back property taxes (TR2 77:6-10 and TRl 34:15-16); that 
she had doctor and dental bills outstanding which were incurred 
by the children (TR2 78-79); that she had student loan 
obligations (TR2 79:8-10); that her home was need of 
substantial repairs (TR2 80-81 and TRl 32-2-34); that she 
required a new washing machine, dryer, stove, bed, and 
furniture (TR2 8:3-22 and TRl 33-34); that she was 4-5 payments 
delinquent on her mortgage payments (TRl 34:10-14); that she 
and the children had during some periods of time had gone 
without milk and bread (TRl 37:8-11); that the minor children 
had a need for new clothing and shoes (TRl 38:1-12); and, that 
the children had not been able to participate in some 
extracirricular activities at school (TRl 41-42). 
The Trial Court made specific findings concerning the 
needs of the Appellee in Amended Findings of Fact, Nos. 10, 26 
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and 27. In Amended Finding of Facts, No. 27 the Trial Court 
specifically found, "at the time of the modification hearing, 
there has been a substantial change in circumstances of the 
parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need for 
an increase in alimony that she has endured substantial and 
significant personal hardships since the time of divorce." 
Clearly, the requirment of a need for alimony was addressed by 
the Trial Court. 
ii. Ability of the Appellee to provide income for 
herself. The Trial Court considered the ability of the 
respondent to provide income for herself. The Appellee testified 
that she earned approximately $12,000.00 gross in the years of 
1986 and 1987, working two part-time jobs. (TR1 63:8-13) At the 
time of the modification hearing the she had lost one of her 
part-time employments and was only earning approximately $600.00 
per month, she was also full time student and raising a family of 
4 minor children (TRl 63-64). 
The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff had a 
substantial need for an increase in alimony. (See Amended 
Finding, No. 27.) 
Clearly, the Trial Court considered the Appellee1s 
ability to provide a sufficient income for herself, and the 
Court's finding is supported by the evidence and testimony at 
trial, as referenced above. 
iii. Appellant's ability to pay alimony. The 
Appellant's income had increased dramatically since the time of 
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the divorce as show by the evidence admitted at trial. (See Trial 
Exhibits 3-7.) Furthermore, the Appellant testified he earned 
$112f000.00 in his private practice of medicine during 1987 and 
also earned wages wages in excess of $16,000.00 during that year. 
(TR2 106-107) 
The Trial Court properly concluded from the testimony 
and evidence that "The Defendant's present income is not 
completely clear but the Court finds based upon the evidence that 
his gross income can be interpreted as being as high as 
$224,000.00 a year but certainly under no circumstances less than 
approximately $120,000.00 per year. (Findings of Fact, No. 17.) 
Again, it cannot be disputed that the Trial Court considered the 
Appellant's ability to pay alimony. 
Finally, this Court, in its written opinion, held "If 
the trial court's findings and conclusions show that the court 
considered the material factors, we accord considerable 
discretion to the trial court in determing the amounts of alimony 
and child support." Without question the Trial Court considered 
the relevant and material factors of Jones in concluding that 
alimony should be increase. Accordingly, the Trial Court's 
findings and this Court's decision on this matter are not properly 
the subject for review on a petition for rehearing of this issue. 
III. 
THIS COURT PROPERLY RULED ON THE 
ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The record and the Amended Findings of Fact of this 
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case are replete with evidence, testimony and references to 
support the Appellee's need for assistance with the attorney's 
fees she incurred in bringing this matter to a hearing. (See 
Amended Finding of Facts, Nos. 10f 13, 22 and 26.) In addition, 
the Trial Court found, in Finding No. 30, "attorney's fees should 
be awarded to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable 
attorney's fees would the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs incurred 
herein." In Finding No. 31, the Trial Court found "Plaintiff's 
Counsel's fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and 
considering the length of time expended and the complexities of 
the issues, the award of attorney's fees is reasonable." 
Clearly, the award of attorney's fees was just and 
proper, considering the testimony and evidence presented at trial 
and by the Findings of the Trial Court, viewed as a whole. 
This Court held that there was no admissible evidence 
in the record to substantiate the reasonabless of the fees and, 
as such, this matter was properly remanded to the Trial Court for 
an evidentiary hearing on this single issue. 
It is again pertinent to note, the Appellant has 
failed to provide this Court with any authority to support his 
position that the award of attorney's fees should be reversed. 
Considering the ruling of the Trial Court on this issue, the 
remand of this issue back to the Trial Court for an evidentiary 
hearing on this issue was proper and a rehearing is not necessary. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 
THE APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL. 
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The Appellant, in Section IV of his Petition for 
Rehearing, is apparently requesting a new trial based upon 
certain matters claimed to have come to light after the hearing 
for modification and because the Trial Court erred since the 
Appellant was not allowed "a fundamental evidentiary hearing," 
(APR, page 6) 
The broad discretionary power of the Trial Court in the 
granting or denying of new trial is well established. Page v. 
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 P2d 290 (Utah 1964); Haslam v. 
Paulsen, 389 P2d 736 (Utah 1964). Furthermore, a ruling on a 
motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal except when 
there is a clear abuse of the Trial Court's discretion. Jensen 
v. Thomas, 570 P2d 574 (Utah 1962); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P2d 99 
(Utah 1981). 
With regard to the right to have a "fundamental 
evidentiary hearing" the Appellant cites no authority to 
substantiate that such a hearing was necessary. 
Despite the lack of authority, it is pertinent to 
review the procedural background of this matter. The Appellant 
filed a motion and memorandum for a new trial with supporting 
affidavits with the Trial Court. The Appellee then responded to 
the Appellant's motion, memorandum and affidavits. 
Rule 4-501 (8) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
provides that motion may be decided by the Court without a 
hearing. Notwithstanding the above cited Rule, the Trial Court 
granted the Appellant oral arguement on his motion. At the 
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conclusion of the oral arguments the Trial Court held that the 
Appellant was not entitled to a new trial. 
The Appellant was granted every opportunity afforded by 
the applicable rules to pursuade the Trial Court that a new trial 
should be granted. This Court and Trial Court, however, were not 
persuaded. Accordingly, Appellant's request for rehearing on this 
issue should be denied. 
In addition, as this Court held, "For newly discovered 
evidence to warrant a new trial, the evidence must have a 
probative weight sufficient to have a probable effect on the 
result. (Cases cited.) "The evidence Mr. Foxley proffers does 
not have that degree of probative value, and the trial court thus 
did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a new 
trial." 
V. 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
IS IMPROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Appellant in his Petition for Rehearing is attempting 
to raise an issue for the first time. Appellant states "(He) 
apologizes for characterizing his motions at trial and post trial 
in his Brief as motion for directed verdict and judgment 
nothwithstanding the verdict." "In actuality, Mr. Foxley brought 
a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment . . . " 
Since this issue was not properly raised by the 
Appellant in his appeal it cannot now be brought before this 
Court in a petition for rehearing. 
Notwithstanding the above, Appellee asserts that it is 
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ludicrous for the Appellant to claim that a summary judgment or 
dismissal of the case should have been granted after the Appellee 
concluded her presentation of evidence. Without question there 
were genuine issues of material fact raised which requried a 
hearing on the merits. As such, the Trial Court was justified in 
dening the Appellant's motion, no matter how he now attempts to 
characterize his motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Appellant filed this appeal, he has filed 
a second appeal with this Court concerning the enforcement of the 
provisions of the modified decree of divorce (Case No. 900493), 
he has filed a motion both in the Trial Court in this Court to 
stay execution of the enforcement of the modified decree, which 
motions were denied becasue the Appellant failed to comply with 
the applicable rules of procedure, and the Appellee has filed two 
motions with the Trial Court to attempt to have the Appellant 
comply with the terms of the modified decree of divorce, for 
example the Appellant has paid no alimony since the decree was 
modified. 
Appellee submits that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is without merit and was filed in bad faith with the 
sole purpose to avoid his obligations, to avoid compliance with 
the provisions of the modified decree of divorce and to harass 
the Appellee by exacting the greatest emotional and financial 
trauma upon her which he is able. 
The Appellant's Petition for Rehearing should be 
dismissed and the opinion of this Court should be affirmed and 
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the Appellee should be granted sanctions, including double costs 
and attorney fees, as provided by Rules 33 and 40 of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals* 
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